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Abstract 
Cultural criminology emerged in the mid-nineties with defining texts 
written by Jock Young, Keith Hayward, and Jeff Ferrell, among others. 
Since its inception, it has been criticized for its shallow connections with 
feminist theory. While in theory cultural criminology clearly 
acknowledges the influence of feminist scholarship, it has in practice 
often only superficially ‘added’ on gender and sexuality to its scholarly 
investigations. Yet, as we argue, research identified with cultural 
criminology has much to gain from feminist theory. This article reviews 
a range of cultural criminological scholarship, particularly studies of 
subcultures, edgework, and terrorism. We investigate three themes 
significant for feminist research: masculinities and femininities, sexual 
attraction and sexualities, and intersectionality. Such themes, if better 
incorporated, would strengthen cultural criminology by increasing the 
explanatory power of resulting analyses. We conclude by advocating that 
feminist ideas be routinely integrated into cultural criminological 
research. 
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One of the main criticisms of cultural criminology, persistent since its 
inception, is that this perspective pays insufficient analytical attention to 
the politics of gender. In response, founders of the field have noted that 
cultural criminology has much in common with feminist criminology 
(Ferrell, Hayward, & Young, 2015; Hayward, 2016). Cultural 
criminologists also refer to the strong impact of feminist methodologies 
on the methods of cultural criminology, including the notion of 
criminological verstehen (Kane, 1998). But while clearly acknowledging 
the influence of feminist scholarship, gender often seems too 
superficially “added on” to cultural criminology, a perspective 
intellectually inspired more passionately elsewhere as it unfolded from 
the 1990s through the present. If so, what can be learned post facto from 
feminist theory that can constructively add to the theoretical reach of this 
criminological “cultural turn”? How can we move gender analysis from 
margin to center, a phrase that borrows from bell hooks’s (1984) well-
known critique of racism’s marginalization over the course of theorizing 
gender? 
In this article, we begin with an overview of why gender matters more 
for cultural criminology than has usually been acknowledged. We review 
cultural criminological work, focusing on research that engages with 
feminist theory and on case studies of varied subcultures, edgework, and 
terrorism. We identify three themes—the study of masculinities and 
femininities, sexuality, and intersectionality—which, if better 
incorporated, would strengthen cultural criminology and increase the 
explanatory power of resulting analyses. Finally, we conclude by 
discussing the implications of this analysis for the future of cultural 
criminology and the study of gender within criminology overall. 
 
Why Gender Matters 
The rise of cultural criminology occurred through the 1990s when in 
sociology—with which criminology in the U.S. academy is closely 
intertwined—a cultural turn was likewise for years afoot. Culture had 
become hugely significant for French theorists from Foucault to Bourdieu, 
Lacan, and Derrida; in the United States, the culture section of the 
American Sociological Association (ASA) grew to be one of the largest 
within the organization. Culture, of course, mediates between agencies and 
structures, and its association with a wide range of practices and 
institutions of everyday life—neighborhood and communities, media, 
religion, ethnic and racial group affiliations, language, customs—was 
plumbed both for its own significance and for its complex influence on the 
reproduction of neoliberalizing global capitalism. Within criminology, the 
publication of Jack Katz’s (1988) The Seductions of Crime was one 
incarnation of this broader cultural turn. Katz’s now-classic work 
introduced “foreground” factors that have been relatively ignored in favor 
of “background” structural analyses, brilliantly focusing on the roles of 
emotions and phenomenological immediacy and contingency to illuminate 
why “criminal/ized” events may (or may not) occur. 
Katz’s work similarly influenced the interdisciplinary orientation of 
cultural criminology. Since the perspective’s inception in 1995 with 
Ferrell and Sanders’s Cultural Criminology, it has focused on the cultural 
meanings of practices defined as “crime” and the cultural dynamics of 
criminalization and control for the late modern condition. Here, culture 
is understood as the “symbolic environment” (Ferrell et al., 2015, p. 3) in 
and through which individuals and groups make sense of their being, their 
actions, and the social and material world. “Culture” is inextricably 
intertwined with structures of power and shaped by existing patterns of 
inequality, but it is not seen as a static entity reducible to class, ethnicity, 
or territory. Rather, for cultural criminologists, culture is dynamic. A 
complex interplay of transgression, criminalization, and control lies at the 
core of the continuous and often paradoxical processes by which meaning 
and identities are negotiated and generated. “Crime” is not simply the act 
of deviating from a social norm, but relates to a wide assortment of 
institutions that engage in the production and circulation of cultural 
meanings that shape perceptions of crime. Consequently, transgression 
and crime are social products meaningful within the specific cultural 
dynamics surrounding them and “must be read in terms of the meanings 
they carry” (Hayward & Young, 2004, p. 259). 
Following this perspective on crime and culture, cultural criminology 
emphasizes human agency and the distinctive creativity of human action 
and practices. Moreover, crucial for cultural criminology, human actions 
and experiences have to be understood in the context of economic 
globalization, the rise of neoliberal ideologies, and increasing economic 
insecurity. As Young (1999) argues with his concept of the bulimic 
society (see also Brotherton & Naegler, 2014), these features of late 
modernity incessantly create new categories of inclusion and exclusion. 
Widespread experiences of “ontological insecurity” pervade late 
modernity; individuals are disembedded from biography, and 
discontinuities of individual narratives result (Young, 2007). 
Then too, in Young’s understanding of culture, social conditions 
cannot be seen as deterministic nor human actions entirely determined by 
structures (Young, 2007). Rather, collective meaning is generated 
through fluid interactive processes; connotations, definitions, rules, and 
values are constantly negotiated and can be maintained and enforced as 
well as discarded, reshaped, or resisted (see also Salman, 2014). 
Furthermore, people cope in multiple ways with emotions evoked by 
intensified conditions of insecurity and seemingly endless, spiraling 
social changes; they find and invent new ways to reassert identity 
(Hayward, 2004). Thus, a richly diverse and creative set of human 
practices confirm the centrality of culture for understanding both social 
life in general and crime in particular. 
But the resulting “combination” of culture and crime seems to overlook 
the role of another important mediating cultural influence on everyday life: 
gender. Returning to Simone de Beauvoir’s (1953) seminal The Second 
Sex, it is clear that the binary of masculinity and femininity is one—if not 
the primary—cultural distinction foisted onto human beings from birth. 
Applied to criminology, this helps to connect gender-based dichotomies in 
emotion and expression—for example, inclinations toward “active” or 
“passive” poses, and toward internalized or “acted out” angers—with 
analogously gender-skewed patterns in crime commission and 
punishment. In her systematic study, Eileen Leonard (1981) found many 
criminological theories could not adequately explain gender differences 
in the rates and types of crimes committed. She thus aruged that good 
criminlogical theory ought to be able to explain gender disparities in who 
commits crime and why.  
This brings us to our main purpose here: Why and how does gender 
matter for cultural criminology? The significance of gender as a core axis 
of both experience and understanding does not appear to have been 
deeply incorporated into cultural criminology’s basic analytic framework 
at the outset. As we show, gender analysis has tended to appear at the 
“margins” rather than as a core element in many works of cultural 
criminology despite this perspective’s other major theoretical strengths. 
Moreover, cultural criminology has been inclined to treat 
“masculinized” activities as its main events—thereafter bringing in 
women (and feminist analyses) mostly when women seem to be involved 
with what could be called “male-dominated” cultural activities such as 
edgework or terrorism. But certainly women can and do engage in 
“criminal” cultural activities that do not simply resemble or mimic the 
kinds of activities engaged in and studied by men. This is one line of 
inquiry cultural criminology can and should pursue, but it is only one of 
many possible avenues that gender-cognizant research on crime and 
culture could advance. 
Given the intellectual context we have sketched, let us turn now to 
three themes culled from de Beauvoir (1953), Butler (1990), hooks 
(1981, 1984), and Collins (2002), among other feminist theorists in and 
outside of sociology and criminology. These themes may be useful for 
expanding cultural criminology’s theoretical reach through a widened 
“gender” lens. The first theme involves how and where both masculinity 
and femininity, in their various iterations, figure into cultural 
criminological analyses. Do ideologies of masculinity affect motivations 
for crime—and, if so, has this tended to be acknowledged or overlooked 
in extant cultural criminological research? Moreover, when the influence 
of masculinities as adopted/imposed ideology is acknowledged, how are 
particular emotional expressions enabled or blocked? This focus on 
masculinity’s influence has appeared in some criminological research 
like the work of James Messerschmidt (2014) but has less actively figured 
in well-known cultural criminological writings per se. In ensuing sections 
we focus on the implication of gender analyses for studying cultural 
criminology. 
A second theme culled from feminist theory involves the influence on 
human behavior and practices of sexuality: Exploring sex has also tended 
to be overlooked in research on the “traditional” topics of cultural 
criminology, from terrorism through edgework and other subcultural 
activities in which both men and women participate. Feminist theorists 
have long diagnosed gender as a form of dominance/subordination that 
relies for its power on exerting control over women’s (and people’s) 
bodies; such controls can be part of culture and its mediations. But greater 
attention to sexuality within cultural criminology also suggests paying 
close attention to sexualities’ pleasures as well as dangers, that is, 
exploring how everyday experiences of desire and attraction often 
motivate people across genders toward or away from crime. 
Last but just as significantly, a third theme taken from feminist theory 
involves the importance of intersectional analyses. Here, we explore how 
multiple factors including gender, race, and class can theoretically 
expand a “feminist cultural” criminology. Feminist theorists increasingly 
insist on recognizing how racialization and class discrimination 
profoundly affect cultural life experiences. Such overlapping biases often 
contribute to the maintenance of a gendered and heteronormative social 
order (e.g., Davis, 2008; Jackson, 2005). While intersectionality at times 
seems to be at risk of being reduced to a buzzword, it offers a refinement 
of feminist analysis that we consider of major significance for cultural 
criminology. We now turn toward showing how these three themes help 
to illuminate cultural criminological research on diverse practices from 
terrorism to edgework. What insights does and can feminist analysis 
bring? 
 
Common Grounds 
Before proceeding, a body of already extant scholarship that indicates 
growing connections between cultural and feminist criminology needs to 
be acknowledged. Seal’s (2013) research on Western media coverage of 
the 2012 arrest of the band members of the Russian feminist punk band 
Pussy Riot is an example of self-identified “feminist cultural criminology.” 
Recognizing the (cultural) criminalization of the band members and their 
self-conscious use of imagery and style as a cultural criminological case 
study par excellence, Seal explores the changing meaning of the female 
protestor in the media as she has been situated in wider geopolitical 
discourses. Seal draws on Alison Young’s (1990) argument in Femininity 
in Dissent that the female protestor is negatively represented as unruly and 
shows that this was not the case for the Western media coverage of Pussy 
Riot and their arrests. Rather than depicting the band members as 
disruptive, or trivializing or ignoring their outspoken feminism, Seal 
(2013) argues that Western media painted these women in a predominantly 
positive light. Central to understanding the positive reception is Pussy 
Riot’s relationship to post–Cold War Western discourse on Russia. In this 
context, Russia is depicted as an authoritarian regime repressing political 
dissent and artistic expression. At the same time, the Western media’s 
support of Pussy Riot allows for a narrative that promotes gender equality 
as a central value of Western societies (Seal, 2013). 
Nonetheless, specifying more precisely what is (or could be) a feminist 
cultural criminology remains absent in Seal’s work. O’Neill’s (2010) 
research on the regulation of sex work in the United Kingdom offers a 
clarification of feminist cultural criminological analysis. O’Neill’s work 
has two objectives: (a) to develop participatory methodologies of 
research that produce politically inclusive forms of knowledge in tune 
with policy questions and (b) to overcome binary thinking that currently 
dominates feminist debates about sex work. Here, positions that argue for 
sex work to be reframed as work/labor under capitalist societies are 
juxtaposed with those emphasizing exploitation of (female) sex workers 
as victims of patriarchal power relations. 
Drawing on the research of Nancy Fraser (2004), O’Neill (2010) 
argues for the simultaneous recognition of female sex workers’ 
subjectivities and of the material conditions within which they work. In 
so doing, she combines both feminist and cultural criminological 
approaches; cultural criminology provides the basis for O’Neill’s cultural 
materialist analysis and informs her participatory and politicized 
methodological approach. Indeed, O’Neill’s treatment of the “historical, 
cultural, and emotional experiences of the people involved” (p. 219) 
resonates with Jock Young’s (2011) concept of the criminological 
imagination. O’Neill further argues for the necessity of using the 
category of intersectionality to provide—without reverting to binary 
thinking—a comprehensive and refined analysis of how both materiality 
and redistribution, as well as recognition and identity, profoundly 
challenge sexual and social inequalities. 
The above illustrations from “feminist cultural criminology” show that 
there are intersections between feminist theory and cultural criminology. 
Nonetheless, we argue that analytic attention to gender, sexuality, and 
intersectionality is relatively marginal in the majority of cultural 
criminological research to date. This tendency reproduces a 
heteronormative masculine lens that paradoxically blunts the potential 
analytic strength of cultural criminology. To make our argument, we 
begin by looking at cultural criminological research involving cultural 
norms of masculinities and femininities. 
 
Masculinities and Femininities 
One of the characteristic features of the cultural criminological 
perspective is its emphasis on emotion, sensation, and experience. 
People, cultural criminologists contend, do not solely commit crime out 
of rational reasons or opportunistic cost-benefit calculations as suggested 
in more orthodox criminology. They are also motivated by emotional 
rewards, whether “moments of illicit pleasure” (Ferrell, 1996, p. 316) or 
other intense emotional experiences of excitement, autonomy, and 
visceral self-actualization. Exploring these experiences is certainly 
profound for understanding, in Katz’s words, the “seductions of crime.” 
However, there are pitfalls in the cultural criminological take on emotions 
and experience in criminal activity that become particularly evident when 
intertwined with questions of masculinity and femininity. It has been a 
common critique by feminist scholars that cultural criminology, in 
addition to being overly attuned to certain kinds of crime more frequently 
enacted by men, endorses (and at times valorizes) a specific cultural ideal 
of “masculine” activity as found in edgework or subcultural activities 
wherein men are the predominant actors. 
Indeed, cultural criminology has been inclined to treat “masculinized” 
activities as its main events. This is the result of, and at the same time has 
resulted in, cultural criminology’s tendency to prioritize a certain set of 
emotions—thrill, excitement, feelings of pride and self-importance, 
control, and power—that are too quickly and often too uncritically seen 
as the domain of men. This inclination to perceive “masculinized” 
activity and experience as the main event is even evident when research 
is fundamentally about exploring notions of femininity, as, for example, 
in Alkemade’s (2014) analysis of women in the Japanese Yakuza. 
Alkemade is mostly concerned with investigating women’s individual 
and subjective experiences, emotions and motivations, and how these 
impact daily experiences within a criminal subculture. Despite this 
objective, she cautions against the use of “heavily gender-based theories” 
(p. 13) such as gender equality theories. She argues that such theories 
tend to overemphasize structure at the expense of agency and alone are 
insufficient to explain why women participate in organized crime. But 
this wariness to engage with feminist theory seems curious as the research 
shows strikingly the highly gendered character of women’s daily 
experience in the male-dominated Yakuza. Indeed, the machismo and 
hypermasculinity prevalent among the Yakuza men result in seeing 
women as “insignificant” and “inferior”—if they are seen at all. Women 
are expected to conform to traditional feminine roles as housewives and 
caretakers, and to provide reproductive, emotional, and sometimes 
financial support. However, while the women rarely engage in criminal 
activity themselves, Alkemade, drawing on Katz, understands their 
motivations as hardly differing at all from those of the Yakuza men. 
Deeply fascinated by the thrill and glamor seemingly offered by the 
Yakuza underworld, women are eventually attracted by the “seductions 
of crime” and its emotional rewards, even if only engaging in it “by 
proxy.” 
Lured by the Yakuza subculture, women who enter soon find 
themselves in a situation characterized by marginalization and 
subordination to the men they come to know within a criminal subculture 
that is patriarchally organized. Rather than having lives filled with 
excitement, they face boredom and routine in their lives as housewives 
confined to the domestic sphere. Consequently, they seek alternative 
avenues to create a sense of self-control. This happens in a twofold way: 
first, they develop an “exaggerated sense of self-importance” (p. 84) as 
expressed in the women’s autobiographical accounts, while the “gutting 
truth” is that they “may be . . . not that important after all” (Alkemade, 
2014, p. 84). Second, they engage in what Alkemade calls “mimicry.” 
Often against the will of their husbands or male partners, the women adopt 
traditional and traditionally male yakuza activities; they perform 
“exclusively male” rituals like getting tattoos. In other words, in reaction 
to the dominance of men and as an attempt to achieve a sense of control 
and excitement, the women in the Yakuza act “as men amongst 
themselves” (p. 84). 
Precisely in this argument, though, one can identify a central 
shortcoming evident in much cultural criminological work: Despite 
engaging with femininity and masculinity, and gendered relations, 
Alkemade’s analysis never fully sheds its “hegemonic masculine lens.” 
It is left open why women are only able to experience thrill and autonomy 
by mimicking and “acting like men” rather than through unmediated 
emotional experiences. The notion of mimicry leaves little space for 
exploring women’s activities, rituals, and subcultural expressions or for 
investigating emotional experiences possibly independent of, and 
different from, those felt by men. In addition, it seems difficult to imagine 
how any criminal organization—let alone one built on closely knit family 
relations like the Yakuza—could survive without the vast amount of 
emotional and reproductive work done by women. Yet the analysis 
renders these traditionally female activities of lesser importance than the 
activities of men and leaves unquestioned the dependence of the latter on 
the former. In doing so, it ignores the possibility that the “exaggerated” 
sense of self-importance stems from women’s commitment to a certain 
ideal of “emphasized femininity” (Connell, 1995). 
For our purposes, it may also be useful to ask whether this “masculine 
lens” is built into some of the very concepts used by cultural 
criminologists—and whether this potentially skewed lens can be 
corrected by critically reflecting on cultural mediations of masculinity 
and femininity and the relation between them. Here, the cultural 
criminological interest in edgework—voluntary high risk-taking—
provides an important case study. The term “edgework” describes acts 
entwined around the negotiation of a boundary line—of life and death, or 
danger and safety—actively sought by the edgeworker not for any 
rational pursuit, but for the very reward of the emotions and sensations 
they elicit. While “original” edgework mostly involved extreme leisure 
activities (Lyng, 1990), an intellectual convergence with Katz’s 
phenomenology of crime may have affected cultural criminologists 
starting to draw attention to the similarities between voluntary high-risk 
pursuits and the emotional experiences of transgressive acts. Those 
engaged in crime as “illicit edgework” expose themselves to high risks 
and develop skills, or the physical and mental abilities, to keep 
concentration and control in situations characterized by unpredictability 
and “chaos.” They act on the edges of safety and danger as much as on 
those of legality and illegality, engaging in processes of what Lyng calls 
“moral transcendence” (Lyng, 2005, p. 28) by consciously transgressing 
rules. In so doing, illicit edgeworkers’ phenomenological experience is 
that of a “controlled sense of loss of control” (Hayward, 2004, p. 163) in 
a paradoxical situation where the individual feels constantly “at risk”; at 
the same time, he or she is externally overcontrolled by structural 
conditions. In other words, illicit edgework is a means to exercise control 
and autonomy by both symbolically and physically confronting those 
sources that seemingly deprive the actor of control over his or her own 
fate. 
In cultural criminology, illicit edgework tends to disproportionally 
take place in what can be seen as “prototypically masculine” high-risk 
activities (Ferrell et al., 2015, p. 75) such as graffiti writing or expressive 
violent crimes. In fact, edgework started as accounting for high-risk 
pursuits that are, as Lyng (1990) posits in one of his earliest formulations 
of the concept, “sex-specific” and thus the domain of men. Men’s specific 
attraction to edgework, according to Lyng (1990), stems from their 
socialization into developing a “skill orientation” (p. 873) that 
encourages them to use these skills to control their immediate 
environment. This also explains why women lack an interest in edgework 
and are less often found among skydivers or BASE jumpers: They are 
simply not socialized into risk-taking and this particular skill orientation 
involving exertions of control. Lyng’s position on risk-taking is 
consequently deeply problematic: It equates risk-taking with “simply 
being male” (Chan & Rigakos, 2002, p. 750) and reifies binaries of the 
“active” male and the “passive” female. But far from being averse to 
them, women take risks—and develop the skill orientation necessary to 
do so—on a daily basis by virtue of simply being women in patriarchal 
and misogynistic societies. Women are forced to take risks in the most 
mundane situations such as walking home alone at night or engaging in 
intimate relationships that can turn violent. But these are “risks” imposed 
in different ways, and by the same patriarchal system that leads men into 
particular risk-taking “attractions”—thus demonstrating the relevance of 
gender for a deeper understanding of cultural criminological interest in 
(mostly) men’s “edgework.” 
Moreover, facing threats of domestic abuse, harassment, and sexual 
assault imposed on them by men, women are held responsible for 
preventing victimization by means of avoidance and precaution. Every 
active exposure to risky situations is accompanied by the necessity to 
negotiate the consequences that come with “victim-blaming” when 
strategies of risk-management fail (Chan & Rigakos, 2002; Stanko, 
1997). Taking into account women’s relational insecurity in patriarchic 
societies might explain, better than socialization, why the “escapist 
impulses” of indulgent high-risk pursuits are of less attractive. Voluntary 
edgework, as feminist scholars have noted (Chan & Rigakos, 2002; 
Miller, 1991), is the domain of those holding societal privilege. For 
women, in particular working-class women and women of color who face 
risks not by choice but by the mere fact of being women, less of a desire 
exists to fabricate exceptional risky situations to cope with experiences 
of alienation, boredom, and ontological insecurity. Again, then, a full 
understanding of “edgework” and risk-taking pursuits necessitates taking 
into account the legacies of gender-skewing that go all the way back to 
de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex analysis. 
In Cultural Criminology: An Invitation, Ferrell et al. (2015) respond to 
such criticisms. They acknowledge the argument that a “masculine” 
perspective on risk in edgework disregards women’s exposure to 
everyday risks, and distance themselves from the gender-unawareness 
manifest in early formulations of the concept. They point out that this 
argument—albeit applying a different explanatory framework—confirms 
the “sex-specificity” of the concept suggested by Lyng. This is precisely 
one of the “easy” gender-based dichotomizations that cultural 
criminology seeks to avoid. Women, they argue, are drawn to extreme, 
voluntary high-risk pursuits equally and for the same reasons as men: 
“Both individually and collectively,” they “often constitute some of the 
more skilled and esteemed members of illicit edgework subcultures” 
(Ferrell et al., 2015, p. 75). Ferrell et al. continue by contending that 
edgework allows for understanding gender and gender dynamics, 
including the considerable numbers of crimes that produce “hegemonic 
masculinity . . . from a mix of risk taking and embodied masculine 
emotion, to the detriment of women” (p. 75). These arguments require 
critical consideration as they seem contradictory at first glance: either 
edgework is a gender-neutral concept or gender matters when it comes to 
edgework. The first position suggests that there are no differences 
between men and women who seek voluntary high-risk pursuits. But, if 
so, the binary of masculinity and femininity so significant as a cultural 
influence in most societies from birth is by extension rendered less 
important, and transposed into one easily neutralized within and by 
cultural practices. A more persuasive second alternative is that both 
femininities and masculinities affect why and how women and men 
engage in edgework as well as how opportunities, expressions, and 
experiences are shaped. For men, then, the cultural inculcation of 
masculinities—especially within patriarchal contexts—is likely to have 
ideological as well as psychosocial consequences for what it means to 
engage in high-risk pursuits. For women, risk-taking is also likely to be 
affected in complex ways by gender. Thus, just “adding on” women’s 
risk-taking pursuits to what could be partly characterized as enculturated 
“masculine” activities— as in Alkemade’s analysis of the Yakuza 
women’s activities— risks overlooking that women may engage in 
edgework in ways which do not simply mimic the kinds of high-risk 
pursuits engaged in by men. 
In fact, cultural criminologists rightly point out that women engage in 
male-dominated forms of edgework (Naegler, 2014). But what is 
important to further theorize is that they never do so in the same ways as 
men. For this reason, we argue that it is not possible to do (and to “do” 
analyses of) edgework in “gender-neutral” ways—or, for that matter, in 
disregard of intersections of class, race, and gender. Rather cultural 
mediations of gender are always there, explicitly or implicitly; they are 
noticed and experienced by those who engage in edgework, and shape 
the ways in which people’s actions are conceived as well as interpreted. 
Here, another interesting example is Lois’s (2005) research on volunteer 
search and rescue groups as edgework. Lois shows that male participants 
were prejudiced against and routinely questioned the physical 
competence and abilities of their female colleagues; both men and 
women naturalized “confidence” in risk-taking as the result of 
testosterone that supposedly made male rescue workers more daring (p. 
149). In this setting, then, women adopted a more cautious attitude 
toward their work and did not experience the same sense of control their 
male peers report—despite the fact that women engaged in the same risky 
endeavors as men. 
Given the impact of cultural mediations of masculinity and femininity, 
these differing perceptions should not be surprising. As Sandra Walklate 
(1997) points out, the relationship between men and risk-taking behaviors 
is widely perceived as positive, while there exists a negative relationship 
between women and risk. Voluntary risk-taking and seeking adventure 
and power are what men do “normally” (Walklate, 1997, p. 41), while 
women are held responsible for preventing risks of victimization by 
taking precautions and not exposing themselves actively to dangers. The 
concept of edgework, typically placing excitement and control at the 
center of myriad analyses, could therefore be said to incorporate—albeit 
unwittingly—the notion of “hegemonic masculinity” (Connell, 1995) by 
accepting men’s risk-taking as part of dominant cultural ideals. As a 
result, women’s high-risk pursuits tend to be subsumed under a 
masculine, or historically male-dominated, cultural framework; in other 
words, women who engage in illicit edgework tend to be interpreted as 
“acting like men” whether in situations where their behavior is 
condemned or where viewed positively and admired. This has the further 
effect of rendering female edgeworkers as an exception from a 
(gendered) norm; their specific experiences may be overlooked precisely 
because of the dominance of hegemonic notions of “femininity” and 
“masculinity” in relation to risk. 
 
Sexuality 
A second theme further shows how work in cultural criminology could 
benefit from according ideas culled from feminist theory. Here, we turn 
to the role of sexuality in everyday “cultural” life and the extent to which 
this is often acknowledged, or may be overlooked, in many cultural 
criminological analyses. Indeed, cultural criminology offers a lens 
through which behaviors recognized as meaningless or self-destructive 
can be understood as exciting; it is an approach that accords actors the 
capacity to derive pleasure from actions otherwise quickly deemed 
“deviant.” Yet many studies within cultural criminology have not 
sufficiently grappled with questions of sexual desire and attraction as 
these interact with gender-influenced risk-taking and other meaning-
making ventures. Then too, at times, cultural criminologists seem to 
perceive erotic desires and thrills as identical for men and women rather 
than investigating culturally gendered differences in how diverse 
sexualities develop and are experienced. 
We begin with the first point (i.e., a tendency to mute and overlook the 
role of sexualities and attraction) before proceeding to the second (i.e., a 
tendency to presume sexual experiences to be relatively the same for men 
and women). The first can be exemplified through cultural criminological 
accounts of terrorism. In a seminal article on the emotive elements of 
terror, Cottee and Hayward (2011) offer compelling yet arguably 
incomplete accounts of the appeal of terrorism. They examine narratives 
of violence, highlighting excitement and desires for meaning and glory 
as underpinning motives. But the extent to which erotic desires shape 
perceptions of what is thrilling and meaningful may be analytically 
omitted from these authors’ narratives, which tend to take the actor’s 
gender and sexuality for granted. For example, Cottee and Hayward cite 
Michael Baumann’s autobiographic account of his life as a West German 
guerrilla, describing how: 
 
He was constantly in motion, always moving from flat to flat and 
from woman to woman. He did a lot of drugs . . . [Never] short of 
money from all the robberies his group were committing . . . (p. 970) 
 
But the fantastical narrative, used to illustrate the emotional 
underpinnings of political violence, would not explain the seductions of 
this lifestyle if the actor were anything but a heterosexual man. Baumann 
desires the freedom to dispose of things, casually making the transition 
from material goods to women. He depicts a James Bond–like fantasy of 
wealth, sex, and drugs. Baumann finds thrilling that which signifies an 
exaggerated masculine ideal: the conspicuous consumption of things, and 
a casual and objectifying disregard for women, both signs of the 
successful achievement of manhood. Consequently, Baumann’s identity 
as a heterosexual man informs the emotional basis of his attraction to 
guerrilla fighting; he is attracted to a lifestyle that allows him to realize 
an exaggerated heteronormative masculinity, one largely unattainable but 
nevertheless rendered highly desirable in popular culture. 
Furthermore, a disregard for women is contrasted with accounts of 
love for one’s comrades that appear elsewhere in the article and suggest 
a possibly homoerotic element within the depicted attraction to terror. 
While Cottee and Hayward (2011) note that love for one’s comrades 
supersedes political or religious motivations among terrorists, they 
underestimate the extent to which such love can be rooted in men’s 
desires to be with one another: 
 
This sense of fierce commitment to one another [Sebastian] Junger 
categorizes as a form of love. Not romantic love but the no less 
charged and encompassing love of comradeship, where every man 
fights not out of adherence to some abstract idea, but in order to 
defend his fellow comrade. (p. 977) 
 
Distinguishing “comradely love” from “romantic love” has the effect of 
preempting investigation into even the possibility that homoerotic 
feelings may also be afoot. The love felt in battle may not be romantic, 
but it certainly appears erotic; the wish to die for one’s comrades is an 
intense wish. The men spend significant time together both in and out of 
battle, forming strong relationships with one another. Moreover, the 
desires in question are ostensibly desires to be with, if we reference 
Herbert Marcuse’s concept of Eros as the human drive of love 
(1955/1966). Thus, what Cottee and Hayward (2011) describe, if not 
romantic, may comprise both homosocial and homoerotic desires to be 
with, which the men reflect in their expressed willingness to die for each 
other. The men would rather die than see their comrades (their loved 
ones) die before them. At least potentially, these may also be expressions 
of sexuality and desire that deserve deeper analysis especially in relation 
to how women (and relationships with women) are viewed. For the way 
the men relate to each other in battle offers a curious contrast with the 
carelessness, the comparative disregard, articulated when they describe 
their sexual escapades with women; the former emotions seem deeper 
when contrasted with the relative superficiality of the latter. It would 
seem, then, that cultural criminology could gain from feminist theories 
about sexuality (and sexualities) which offer a more multidimensional 
analytic framework by which to explain what may be attractive about 
terrorism for the heterosexual men the article studies. 
But another issue also arises with regard to cultural criminology’s 
ability to multidimensionally analyze terror: What about women 
terrorists and their motivations? Since 2014, the world has been grappling 
with the rise of the terrorist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), specifically with its appeal to young men and women. News 
media have been unable to understand ISIL’s success at recruiting young 
women, often referring to the recruits as “lured prey” and “fangirls.” Part 
of the difficulty is that some are as young as 16 years of age, that is, 
adolescent girls with little life experience to guide them. However, the 
bigger issue is that women of various ages appear ready to leave 
everything behind to marry an ISIL warrior and keep the mission of ISIL 
alive. The notion of predation is solely applied to women. Men are either 
predators or active participants who join ISIL because of its millennial 
ideology, its promises of glory, and its encouragement of enslavement 
and rape of non-Muslim women. What eludes media analysis, reflecting 
cultural reluctance to recognize the agency of female desire, is that 
sexuality appears central to ISIL’s recruitment both for men and women. 
For women, ISIL glorifies the notion of marrying a warrior, referring to 
ISIL women as “mothers of believers”; it offers women a pseudofeminist 
narrative of autonomy from the meek authority of clerics and even 
parents. Finally and simply, marriage to an ISIL warrior offers women a 
chance to experience sex. 
Unfortunately, not just the media but cultural criminology has also 
generally overlooked this possibly sexual dimension of ISIL’s attractions 
for women. In popular publications, Cottee vacillates between describing 
ISIL women as “fangirls” who are infatuated with ISIL warriors (2015) 
and rejecting the notion that ISIL women are “fangirls” who are seduced 
by ISIL boys (2016). Neither position, though, treats women’s sexual 
desires as potential motivation. In the first instance, referring to young 
women as “fangirls” obscures what may be desires for (and curiosity 
about) sex as well as hopes of autonomy from parental and community 
control. By portraying women as relatively passive, this also overlooks 
reports based on interviews with defected ISIL women suggesting that 
they sometimes play a significant role in the nonmilitant wings of ISIL 
(i.e., in both the morality brigade and the sex-slave trade that are central 
to ISIL’s success, see Speckhard & Yayla, 2015). 
The other characterization—that the women are simply fiercely 
committed to the ideology of ISIL—is also problematic insofar as it fails 
to allow that women can be “seduced” by something without becoming 
hapless and losing their agency. Indeed, cultural criminological accounts 
of terrorism recognize that men who engage in terrorism are motivated 
primarily by immediate goals like living out a fantastic lifestyle of thrill 
and excitement, or dying for each other in battle (Cottee & Hayward, 
2011); these accounts characterize men as actively rather than passively 
“seduced.” But if men can be seduced by glory, material things, and sex 
without giving up their agency, women can also be seduced by glory, 
material things, and sex without becoming passive “lured” prey. In other 
words, one should not dismiss the notion that women join ISIL as wives 
of fighters who seek love and companionship in marriage. They believe 
in the ideology of ISIL, but they are also seduced by the immediate 
prospect of autonomy, power, and romantic relations. In a New York 
Times report, women who defected from the group openly talked about 
enjoying power and the fear they struck in their communities as they led 
the morality brigade and imposed codes of modesty on other women. 
This suggested both a desire for traditional gender roles provided by 
marriage and pleasure in exercising power over other women. Some 
lamented of soon losing the excitement of love and sex and expressed 
sadness over their husbands’ deaths in suicide missions (Moaveni, 2015). 
Overall, then, Cottee’s analysis (2016) overlooks the extent to which 
both masculine and feminine gender ideals shape young people’s desires 
to join ISIL while underestimating the extent to which women can and 
are agents of their own sexualities. Desiring sex does not reduce women 
to lured prey, nor does it necessarily take away from their ideological 
commitment to the group’s mission. Rather— as may be a point from 
feminist theory important to recognize in and beyond cultural 
criminology— sexuality functions as a major motivation for men and 
women (see Reich [1972] 2012). But what about the second respect in 
which cultural criminology has not fully incorporated understandings of 
sexuality—this one not so much a tendency to mute and overlook the role 
of sex and attraction but to presume that sexualities are similar rather than 
possibly different across genders? 
Concerning the second point, let us turn to Gailey’s (2009) research on 
women’s engagement in the pro-ana community. Gailey describes a 
(mostly) virtual community that interprets anorexia and bulimia as 
“female edgework,” that is, as voluntary choices of lifestyle made by 
young, predominantly White middle-class women who push themselves 
to the edges of life and death within this community. In so doing, they 
experience corporeal sensations and intense emotions described as 
fulfilling, as well as a sense of autonomy in their everyday lives. Gailey 
argues that these pro-ana women construct their activities in terms of 
choices that, in turn, challenge gendered stereotypes of feminine 
passivity (p. 106). 
As Gailey emphasizes, understanding the young women’s activities as 
edgework rather than falling back on pathologizing perspectives about 
eating disorders qua mental illness allows for taking women’s agency 
into account. She concludes that, therefore, edgework cannot be 
considered a male-dominated behavior because women engage in 
edgework similar to men: Their experiences and motivations do not differ 
qualitatively from the kind of masculine high-risk activities highlighted 
in cultural criminological accounts. Where gender does make a difference 
though, she argues, is in responses and reactions—That is, women are 
more likely than men to become stigmatized when engaging in high-risk 
pursuits. To be sure, Gailey is correct to note how women’s risk-taking 
endeavors are stigmatized and overlooked. But, more importantly for our 
purposes here, Gailey’s example of female edgework ironically 
demonstrates that women do not engage in edgework in exactly the same 
way or for the same reasons as men. Certainly men and women are not 
ontologically different; however, their experiences, accesses, and 
sometimes motivations are dissimilar precisely because they are subject 
to different cultural and social expectations and reactions. In this case, 
women’s choices to engage in explicitly “female” edgework result from 
seeking avenues of emotional self-expression, control, and even the 
fulfillment of erotic desires otherwise blocked. As Gailey quotes one of 
her participants describing after starting to fast after “restraint” eating, 
the visceral experience of starvation holds a distinctly erotic dimension: 
 
But I’ll starve myself again, for the sense of power over my body. 
It’s almost an erotic feeling. Feeling better about your body is 
extremely sensuous. (p. 104) 
 
Gailey insists that the erotic pleasure experienced is same as the thrills 
sought by graffiti artists and skydivers. Yet this argument does not 
explain why young women seek erotic experiences that morph into 
hidden and self-directed violence (and self-destructiveness). Pro-ana 
subculture seems to manifest women’s desire to experience their 
sexualities as independent from those of men. But the physical harm self-
imposed by pro-ana women reveals something more problematic: For 
women, whose sexual freedom and sexual expressiveness have 
historically been blocked and subordinated in male-centric cultures like 
our own, risk-taking pursuits may be both liberating and internally 
destructive, rendering pro-ana subculture a violent reaction to a violent 
culture of control in ways different than men may experience. 
Indeed, as Chan and Rigakos (2002) point out, women who seek 
excitement and erotic pleasure in risky encounters have to negotiate not 
only risks of physical harm but also a culture hostile to women’s 
sexuality. Women’s supposed sexual “promiscuity” is still widely 
considered deviant; it is publicly shamed and represented as justifications 
for sexual and physical violence, and too often for rape, enacted by men 
against women. Thus, female “sexual edgeworkers” are distinct from 
male “sexual edgeworkers” in that the former must “carefully negotiate 
the structurally imposed line between . . . the Madonna and the whore 
image” (Chan & Rigakos, 2002, p. 755). In contrast with men, women 
often need to adopt additional/extra strategies of risk-management to 
prevent judgment, negative labeling, condemnation, and violence. Far 
from being the same as men’s edgework, then, women’s edgework 
appears to take place against a different cultural backdrop and within a 
different context—and, as such may be differently motivated. 
 
Intersectionality 
When it comes to a third theme—intersectionality—it should be noted 
that efforts have been made within cultural criminology to incorporate 
this important and relatively recent emphasis in the unfolding of feminist 
theory. Contemporary feminist theory and research have evolved to the 
point where studying intersectionality—that is, how gender, sexualities, 
race/ethnicity, and class discriminations overlap—has become common. 
Feminist scholars have learned to investigate both women’s relative 
powerlessness in patriarchal societies and interconnections between 
class, race, and gender, that is, multiple and complicated experiences of 
oppression and domination that are phenomenologically experienced. 
Nonetheless, within cultural criminology, examples can be found both of 
scholarship that can gain from a fuller interpretation of intersectionality 
and of research admirably attentive to interrelated experiences of race, 
class, gender, and sexual biases. 
Returning to research on terrorism, the work of Mark Hamm—while 
not explicitly using the vocabulary of intersectionality—nonetheless 
targets the role of class and race in illuminating the rise of White 
supremacist terrorist groups in the United States. In a 2004 article, Hamm 
finds that neo-Nazi groups are mostly comprised of young, working-class 
White men. Some of the young men have witnessed social decay in their 
communities, thereafter drifting into delinquency; others’ lives develop 
differently. But attraction often occurs when the young men are 
introduced to a subculture that has a specific style and ethos, triggering 
“the vitality . . . necessary for skinheads to ‘go berserk’ on their perceived 
enemies” (Hamm, 2004, p. 327). Thus, Hamm compellingly makes the 
connection between being a young White working-class man in a 
postindustrial society and the appeal of militant White supremacy 
subcultures. Yet what his analysis overlooks is the extent to which 
culturally specific expectations of White working-class men leave some, 
who do not fulfill said expectations, more “vulnerable” than others to the 
seductions of macho White supremacy. This is where individual 
differences, including psychosocially unique biographies, become 
relevant—and where cultural criminological study of terrorism forces us 
to reckon with the hard fact that those who inflict brutal violence are 
complicated indeed, and can differ greatly as to how their personal 
histories mix class and racial factors with biases more specifically related 
to gender, sexuality as well as personality. 
Take Hamm’s case study of Peter Langan: It illustrates how an analysis 
already alive to race and class influences might have further benefited 
from taking gender, sexuality, and the psychosocial further into account 
(Hamm, 2004). Langan was the founder of the Aryan Republican Army 
(ARA) and had a criminal history that included illegal trafficking in 
firearms and explosives. In 1992, the FBI pursued him for his 
involvement in a plot to assassinate President George H. Bush (Hamm, 
2004). In terms of what C. Wright Mills called personal biography, 
Langan was born in 1958 to Eugene Langan and Mary Ann McGregor; 
he was one of six children and soon became his mother’s favorite child, 
receiving “feminine pampering during his formative years” (Hamm, 
2004, p. 329). But Hamm does not make clear what he means by 
“feminine pampering” and what role, if any, this played in generating 
Langan’s delinquency and turn to political violence. Unexplained, 
Langan’s relationship with his mother is woven into the narrative of 
drifting with the tacit assumption that readers share a singular definition 
of masculinity such that a “mama’s boy” who receives “feminine 
pampering” needs no further explanation. Presumed is that boys who 
have too close of a relation with their mothers turn out to be less-than-
ideal men: In this case, for instance, Langan was sexually confused, an 
ARA leader by day and cross-dresser by night (Hamm, 2004). 
While there were other factors contributing to Langan’s unraveling, 
Hamm returns to Langan’s relationship with his mother. He recounts the 
Langan family relocating in 1961 to Saigon where Eugene was involved 
in a political plot to assassinate South Vietnam’s president Ngô Đình 
Diệm. The family returned to the United States in 1963 where Langan’s 
French and Vietnamese fluency and appearance made him a target of 
bullying in school: “Almost overnight, he went from being a pampered 
mama’s boy to being the victim of hate” (Hamm, 2004, p. 330). While 
the turn to sex, drugs, and rock and roll is in many ways in the 1960s 
“spirit of the times” (Hamm, 2004, p. 330), there is a persistent hint that 
Langan’s delinquency was linked to the loss of his father, and his 
“confusion over his newly discovered urge to dress up in his mother’s 
clothing” (Hamm, 2004, p. 330). Hamm’s case study is eventually 
explained in terms of “a crisis in masculinity” whereby Langan turned to 
White Power to gain the respect of other men (p. 336). Problematically, 
though, Langan’s “crisis” of realizing a specific masculine ideal is left 
unexplored in the article. In fact, what Langan struggled with is a 
heteronormative articulation of masculinity, often normalized in White 
lower-middle and working-class communities, that left Langan a victim 
of bullying as a child in school and of sexual violence as a young man in 
prison. Thus, by referring to Langan as a “mama’s boy” without 
exploring the ideological content of this term, Hamm inadvertently reifies 
the very masculinity that precipitated Langan’s crisis. Simultaneously, 
Hamm’s account is left unable to explain with full multidimensionality 
the biographical narrative he otherwise quite thoroughly explores. 
Langan’s narrative also suggests other problems that might have been 
advantageously explored: Not only sexuality but gendered mandates may 
have been relevant to his case given hegemonic social expectations of 
child-rearing that may have left him especially vulnerable to violence. As 
an adult, Langan struggled to live up to rigid codes of gender as well as 
sexuality that mutually constitute normative masculinity. Moreover, both 
factors arguably help to explain his attraction to right wing militancy. 
Langan desired a transgressive and socially stigmatized identity while 
desiring a repressive social order wherein such differences are flattened. 
Langan’s gender identity crisis in a world hostile to nongender 
conformists left him alienated and, in turn, susceptible to right wing 
authoritarianism. A violent macho group appeared, then, as an avenue to 
relieve the pain of not fitting into the world as well as providing a façade 
beneath which he could explore his nonconforming desires. 
If Hamm’s work exemplifies cultural criminological scholarship 
focused on race and class potentially deepened by greater attention to 
gender and sexuality-based norms, the work of feminist criminologists 
such as Eleanor Miller and Valli Rajah —both of whom studied 
edgework—illustrates research explicitly attuned to gender and sexuality 
that also integrates sensitivity to racial and class biases women and men 
face. Both Miller and Rajah illustrate that while much cultural 
criminological work has not adequately used feminist theory, important 
exceptions exist. Thus, Miller (1986, 1991), a feminist Marxist and strong 
critic of Lyng, utilizes the edgework concept in her research on female 
African American street sex workers who “choose especially risky 
hustles” (Miller, 1991, p. 1533). As she contends, women involved with 
high-risk encounters are motivated similarly as Lyng’s edgeworkers to 
seek excitement, adrenaline rushes, and the achievement of a sense of 
control and autonomy in situations otherwise pervaded by everyday 
experiences of powerlessness and male objectification. 
Analogously, in her study of poor, drug-using and largely African 
American and Puerto Rican women who experience habitual domestic 
abuse by their male partners, Rajah (2007) identifies activities she calls 
“edgework-resistance.” In attempting to rebel against the constraints and 
patriarchal control of their intimate partners, women overtly and covertly 
“resist” in borderline zones of safety-and-relative danger; they undertake 
small acts of defiance and disobedience, aware that they risk physical 
harm should their partners retaliate violently. Acts of edgework-
resistance thus draw on “context-specific” knowledge such as partner’s 
habits, weaknesses, strengths, dislikes, and/or probable reactions; if 
accomplished successfully, such acts provide for “embodied rewards” 
(Rajah, 2007, p. 201) like experiences of autonomy and self-
determination. 
Both Rajah and Miller show that by engaging in edgework, women use 
agency in eliciting emotional pursuits and visceral pleasures within 
situations marked by their relative powerlessness; these situations 
thereby allow for enactments of control. However, women who engage 
in edgework are not simply “mimicking” men, as in the critique presented 
above, but develop specific social practices shaped by the combination 
of their multiple, “intersectional” experiences of oppression. This can 
result in women’s resistance to one specific form of oppression all the 
while their practices are subtly reproducing another. As Rajah points out, 
the women in her study are forced to negotiate between resistance and 
financial dependency to their male partners, and between cultural 
imperatives that assign responsibility to women for preventing domestic 
abuse while demanding that they maintain the stability of a relationship. 
By acting in stereotypical feminine ways while high risk-taking, women 
may contribute to the maintenance of the current gendered social order 
(analogously to how, in male-dominated edgework, masculine gender 
stereotypes are also reproduced). In addition, Miller emphasizes that the 
illegal sex work subject of her study is a high-risk situation almost by 
definition; given dangers of arrest and/or physical violence by men, this 
is so regardless of whether women seek or avoid risky situations. In both 
cases, women’s edgework is not a “desired choice” but must be 
understood in the context of structural inequality, economic 
marginalization, and dependency; without a sense of gender, race, and 
class intersectionality, both of their case studies would be only partially 
explanatory. For it is because of multiple overlapping social factors that 
these examples of women’s edgework involve risks that “far exceeds 
those of working- and middle-class white men” (Miller, 1991, p. 1532). 
Consequently, edgework practices have very different cultural meanings 
depending on gender, sexuality, race, and class; while “experimentally 
and in terms of social psychological impact, edgework might be 
functionally equivalent across [different societal] groups,” the “structures 
of oppression to which [edgework] responds are unique” (Miller, 1991, 
pp. 1533-1534). 
Such attentiveness to intersections of class, race, and gender in Miller’s 
and Rajah’s accounts allows for a necessary refinement of the edgework 
concept by making visible both women’s relative powerlessness in 
contemporary society and their attempts to control or resist multiple 
forms of oppression. Men’s edgework (and “masculine” edgework) 
needs to be analyzed with a similarly sophisticated sense of 
multidimensionality, and with analogous sensitivity to men’s experiences 
of power and powerlessness as both shape their risk-taking pursuits and 
motivations. 
 
Discussion 
Cultural criminologists often emphasize this perspective’s advantages as 
a “free intellectual space” for the critique of orthodox criminologies. 
Indeed, cultural criminology offers progressive analyses and “invitational 
openness” (Ferrell et al., 2015, p. 25) that is friendly toward feminist 
endeavors and critical of male-dominated societies’ historical sexism. It 
is exactly in this spirit that this article has offered an equally friendly 
critique, calling for gender to become a regular and not “added on” 
component of cultural criminology’s theoretical program and empirical 
investigations. To date, albeit with some exceptions, cultural criminology 
has tended to “add on” considerations of gender and sexuality rather than 
according both key places in its research and scholarly investigations. In 
turn, however unintentionally, this lack of gender awareness risks 
mimicking the effects of sexism itself through the unwitting 
incorporation of a hegemonic, “masculine” analytic lens. 
Moreover, the above problem hinders the ability of the perspective to 
fully grasp the complexity of cultural dynamics as they influence, and are 
influenced by, also distinctively cultural mediations of gender and sex. 
While cultural criminology has succeeded in exemplifying Clifford 
Geertz’s concept of thick description, offering detailed accounts of social 
actors’ everyday lives in both ordinary and extraordinary moments, it 
may have not accorded gender and sexuality their due as these affect the 
multidimensionality of human practices. This relative overlooking of 
gender and sex as units of analysis presents a problem given the 
perspective’s intention of elucidating the emotive bases of deviance and 
transgression. For the attractions of crime cannot be fully explained 
without accounting for hegemonic codes of femininity and masculinity, 
and for societal repression of desires and emotions. Thus, while 
conventional studies of crime and transgression can and should learn 
from the cultural criminological approach, cultural criminology can 
enrich its own otherwise rich interpretive powers by moving gender and 
sex—as objects of analysis—from its margins to its center. 
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